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4.1  Introduction 
During the 1960s and the 1970s, the U.S. government closely regulated the 
single-family housing finance system. The regulation manifested itself in a 
highly specialized system with four notable characteristics. First, because fed- 
erally  chartered  depository  institutions  were  prohibited  from  originating 
adjustable-rate mortgages (ARMs), virtually all home buyers used the long- 
term (twenty- to thirty-year) fixed-rate mortgage (FRM). Second, portfolio re- 
strictions and tax inducements led nonbank depository institutions (savings 
and loans [S&Ls] and mutual savings banks [MSBs]) to supply two-thirds of 
all funds to the home mortgage market. Moreover, the tax inducement caused 
home mortgage rates to be roughly a half percentage point lower than they 
would otherwise have been. Third, because depository institutions were fund- 
ing their FRMs with short-term deposits, deposit rate ceilings were imposed 
when interest rates rose significantly. Fourth, because the capital market could 
not compete with “cheap” deposit money, few conventional mortgages (those 
not government insured) were pooled into mortgage pass-through securities. 
As a result of these four characteristics, the U.S. housing sector was extremely 
vulnerable to increases in interest rates that caused deposits to flow out of the 
depository institutions, thereby restricting credit availability. 
Portfolio restrictions, tax inducements, prohibitions against ARMs, and de- 
posit rate ceilings were all removed in the 1980s, and, not surprisingly, the 
housing finance system changed markedly. Between early 1982 and 1989, two- 
fifths of all new loans had adjustable, not fixed, rates, and S&Ls reduced their 
holdings of FRMs (both whole loans and mortgage pass-throughs) by  15 to 20 
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percent. Moreover, the fraction of conventional FFW  originations that have 
been pooled into pass-throughs rose from less than one-twentieth before 1981 
to over one-half after 1985. With the opportunity of borrowers to shift to lower 
coupon ARMs when rates rise and with the integration of the home mortgage 
market with capital markets generally, one would expect that the U.S. housing 
sector is now  less sensitive to rising interest rates than it was  in the 1960s 
and 1970s. 
In this paper, I begin by  documenting these changes in the U.S. housing 
finance system and then describe the impact of  these changes on the FRM 
market in the 1980s. In sections 4.4 and 4.5, I attempt to relate changes in real 
house prices and home ownership to these changes and survey recent studies 
of housing demand and supply in the United States to determine whether the 
interest sensitivity of  housing production has been reduced. A final section 
offers some concluding thoughts. 
4.2  U.S. Housing Finance, 1961-89 
I begin with a general overview of U.S. housing finance, with emphasis on 
the pre-1982 period. I then examine the major finance evolutions of the 1980s: 
the widespread securitization of conventional FRMs, the development of a na- 
tional primary market for ARMs, and the decline of the S&L industry.' 
4.2.1 
Table 4.1 lists, for four-year periods from 1962-65 to 1986-89, the fraction 
of the increase in outstanding home mortgages absorbed by each of three inves- 
tor groups: nonbank depository institutions (S&Ls, MSBs, and credit unions), 
commercial banks, and others. S&L and MSB net purchases of agency securi- 
ties are assumed to be purchases of mortgage pass-throughs and are thus in- 
cluded in their mortgage absorptions. 
The far right column gives the ratios for the total 1962-77  period. As can be 
seen, the nonbank depository institutions absorbed two-thirds of the increase in 
outstandings (S&Ls alone accounted for 60 percent between 1969 and 1977) 
and the other third was  split about equally between commercial banks and 
other investors (federally sponsored credit agencies, predominantly Federal 
National Mortgage Association  [Fannie Mae], contributed over half  of  the 
other). There is some variation within the four four-year subperiods. In particu- 
lar, thrifts absorbed only 54 percent of the increase in outstandings during the 
1966-69  period,  when deposit rate ceilings limited their ability to  attract 
funds, and a full 72 percent in the 1970-73 period, when deposits surged (see 
figure 4.1). The other sector picked up the slack in  1966-69  (over half by 
the sponsored agencies) and added few home mortgages in  1970-73,  when 
insurance companies liquidated a quarter of their holdings. 
An Overview Emphasizing the 1960s and 1970s 
1. This overview draws, quite heavily at times, on Hendershott (1991) Table 4.1  Ratio of Increases in Home Mortgage Holdings to Increases in Total Home Mortgages 
Outstanding 
1962-65  1966-69  1970-73  1974-77  1978-81  1982-85  1986-89  1962-77 
Nonbank depository institutions”  .67  .54  .I2  .66  .41  .38  .23  .66 
Commercial banks  .16  .18  .22  .I7  .16  .10  .17  .18 
Other  .17  .28  .06  .17  .43  .52  .60  .16 
“S&Ls, MSBs, and credit unions (the latter did not purchase as much as 1 percent of  the increase in outstandings until 
the 1980s).  Data for the S&Ls and MSBs include increases in agency securities, which are assumed to be mortgage 
pass-throughs. 
Source:  “Financial Assets and Liabilities Year-End,  1966-1989,”  Flow  of  Funds Accounts, Board of  Governors of 
the Federal Reserve System, Washington, D.C.,  September 1990 (and Year-End, 1961-84,  October 1985 for pre- 
1966 data). 68  Patric H. Hendershott 
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Fig. 4.1  Real deposits at thrift institutions (quarterly percentage of change at 
annual rates) 
Source: Throop 1986, chart  1. 
The  1978-81  period was  a replay of  the  1966-69  period in  that deposit 
growth slowed, but the period of reduced growth was far longer, owing to the 
more prolonged and sharper rise in market interest rates (see figure 4.1). Many 
thrifts were reluctant to bid for deposits, in spite of a loosening of deposit rate 
ceilings with the June 1978 introduction of money market certificates and the 
Deregulation and Monetary Control Act of  1980, because the spreads between 
their asset portfolio yields and the cost of deposits became so large. The surge 
in other net purchases reflected greater participation by  a broad spectrum of 
investors, with households (largely through owner financing of  house sales) 
being the largest purchasers. Relative to the 1974-77  period, households in- 
creased their share of  the market by  8 percentage points, and the federally 
sponsored credit agencies, state and  local governments, and insurance compa- 
nies each increased their share by 4 percentage points. 
The post-1981 period showed a continued decline in thrift absorptions, in 
spite of substantial real deposit growth, and a continued rise in the other share 
to 60 percent in the 1986-89  period. The post-1981 period is marked by  un- 
precedented regulatory changes and will be discussed in detail shortly. Before 
turning to it, I first explain the motivation for the heavy S&L and MSB invest- 
ment in home mortgages in the 1960s and 1970s. 
Portfolio restrictions on S&Ls (no corporate loans, bonds, or equity issues) 
encouraged investment in residential mortgages prior to the 1980s. Moreover, 
residential mortgages were especially profitable to thrifts (S&Ls and MSBs), 
owing to a special tax preference. The preference was the ability of thrifts to 
compute loan loss reserves that far exceeded a reasonable provision for normal 
losses, as long as thrifts invested a large fraction of  their assets in housing- 69  Housing Finance in the United States 
related loans or liquid assets (Hendershott and Villani 1980, appendix). That 
is, thrifts were allowed to transfer large portions of their pretax income to re- 
serves, thereby reducing their tax liability. Between 1962 and 1969, the transfer 
was limited to 60 percent of taxable income; between 1969 and 1979, the frac- 
tion was gradually reduced to 40 percent; the 1986 Tax  Reform Act lowered 
the fraction to 8 percent. 
The incentive provided by  the extraordinary loan loss provisions depends on 
the expected level of thrift taxable profits over the expected life of the invest- 
ment (with no profits now or in the future, the incentive is zero), the income 
tax rate, and the statutory fraction of income that can be transferred to reserves. 
Assuming a 1 percent net pretax return on assets, the incentive was substantial 
in the 1960s and 1970s (Hendershott and Villani 1980). In the 1960s, S&Ls 
would have  accepted a pretax return on tax-preferred housing-related assets 
0.75 percentage point lower than on comparable nonpreferred assets. The max- 
imum transfer fraction decline throughout the 1970s, and by  1979, when the 
transfer fraction was down to 40 percent, thrifts would have accepted 0.5 per- 
centage point less. Of  course, with a transfer fraction of  only 8 percent, or 
minimal  profit  expectations, mortgages  have  virtually  no  advantage over 
other investments. 
4.2.2  Securitization of Conventional Fixed-Rate Mortgages 
In 1970, the Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation (Freddie Mac) was 
chartered to spur the development of  a secondary market for conventional 
mortgages.  Freddie Mac  introduced the  first conventional  mortgage pass- 
through security in  1971. Fannie Mae initiated a conventional pass-through 
program similar to Freddie Mac’s in 198  1. Investors in pass-throughs receive a 
pro rata share of the underlying mortgage payments, both scheduled and early 
in the event of prepayment or default. A major attraction of these pass-throughs 
is that Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac guarantee the investors’ payments even if 
the underlying mortgages default.2 
The conventional loan volume that can be securitized by the sponsored agen- 
cies (Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac) is restricted by limits on the dollar value 
of loans that can be pooled into their pass-through securities. The dollar limit, 
known as the “conforming” limit, changes annually with a house price index 
and was $187,600 in  1989, up 63 percent since 1985 (the limit was virtually 
unchanged in 1990). In  1987, over 90 percent of  home mortgage loans (80 
percent of  dollar volume) was eligible for pooling by the agencies, and this 
percentage has been fairly constant in the 1980s. 
The best measure of the agencies’ presence in the conforming FRM market 
is the share of new (generally defined as less than one year since origination) 
conventional FRMs eligible for agency securitization (under the conforming 
2. The guarantee is especially attractive to investors because of the general view that the federal 
government implicitly stands behind the debt of these agencies. 70  Patric H. Hendershott 
limit) that is, in fact, securitized by Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac. This share 
rose from 4 percent in the 1977-8 1 period, to almost 25 percent in the 1982-85 
period, and to over 50 percent since 1986, including 69 percent in 1989 (Hen- 
dershott 1990).3  That is, in less than a decade, the agencies and their pass- 
throughs have gone from being a negligible factor to being the driving force in 
the market. 
Two major factors drove the increase in conventional loan securitization in 
the 1980~~  First, thrifts maintained their share of  mortgage originations but 
reduced their relative investment in home mortgages (sold some of the origi- 
nated mortgages). Most strikingly, the share of S&L total assets in home mort- 
gages  and  agency  securities (largely Fannie Mae  and  Freddie Mac  pass- 
throughs) fell from 72 to 59 percent during the 1982-84  period. This portfolio 
shift reflected the reduced profitability of  S&Ls and the expansion of  S&L 
asset powers. The reduced profitability eroded the tax incentives for residential 
mortgage investment, while the expansion of powers encouraged thrifts to in- 
vest more ~idely.~  Second, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac pass-throughs are 
excellent collateral for borrowing via Federal Home Loan Bank (FHLB) ad- 
vances and security repurchase agreements, and in the 1980s these became 
cheaper marginal sources of funds than deposits for many S&Ls. During the 
1984-88 period, S&Ls increased such debt by over $150 billion. That is, some 
loans were simply swapped for pass-throughs, and the pass-throughs were re- 
tained in portfolio and “repoed” or used as collateral for increased advances. 
4.2.3  Adjustable-Rate Mortgages 
Periodically in the  1960s and  1970s, increases in interest rates reminded 
thrifts of the problems of borrowing short and lending long, and thrifts lobbied 
for permission to offer borrowers an alternative to the FRM, the ARM, that 
would reprice more in line with thrift deposits. Congress made clear to the 
regulatory body (then the Federal Home Loan Bank Board) that it did not want 
borrowers to have that choice (Cassidy 1984). In December 1978, an exception 
was made for federally chartered S&Ls in California, allowing them to com- 
pete with state-chartered S&Ls, and in July 1979, nationwide authority to in- 
vest  in  ARMs  with  tight interest-rate caps  was  granted. However, tightly 
3. The securitization of conventional conforming ARMs by Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac is less 
prevalent. It appears that only 2 to 3 percent were securitized in 1984-85  and that the percentage 
is still only 10 to 12 percent. The greater securitization of FRMs than ARMs likely reflects both 
the greater standardization of FRMs and the greater desire of originators to hold ARMs in their 
portfolio. (Some investment banks  and large thrifts also securitize home mortgages, but these 
institutions largely-possibly  exclusively-limit  themselves to nonconforming or jumbo loans 
and they likely securitize only 10 to 20 percent of the market.) 
4.  Over 50 percent of new government-insured originations (Federal Housing Administration 
[FHA] and Veterans Administration  [VA] mortgages) was securitized-put  into GNMA pass- 
throughs-by  1976,80 percent by  1981, and 100 percent by  1985. FHANA originations declined 
from 30 percent of  the total FRM market in the early 1980s to 20 percent in the late 1980s. 
5. The vengeance with which some S&Ls used the new asset powers was undoubtedly driven 
by a desire to “double their bets,” given that the market value of their net worth was negative. 71  Housing Finance in the United States 
capped ARMs were not much of an alternative to the FRM, and these loans 
were not popular. 
In April  1981, fairly liberal regulations were implemented for federally 
chartered thrifts, and in August  1982, these were loosened further and ex- 
tended  via  the  Deposit  Institutions Act  to  all  state-chartered institutions. 
Thrifts took advantage of this opportunity. In the middle of  1982, ARMs were 
only  10 percent of  the  single-family mortgage portfolio of  FSLIC-insured 
S&Ls. By  March 1989, 48 percent of  the thrift single-family loan portfolio 
(including mortgage pass-throughs) was in ARMs (Hendershott and Shilling 
1992). Moreover, over the 1984-89 period, ARMs accounted for 43 percent of 
the conventional single-family loan volume originated by all lenders. 
The expansion of ARMs could significantly reduce the volatility of housing 
demand. At any point in time, the initial coupon on an ARM is less than that 
on a FRM, but the coupon on the ARM can easily rise above the original FRM 
contract rate during the life of  the contract. Thus a borrower is faced with 
trading off a lower initial coupon against greater uncertainty about the coupon 
in later years. Borrowers prefer a lower initial coupon because it allows them 
to qualify for a larger loan and thus reduces the “affordability” problem, but 
they dislike interest-rate risk. 
Which mortgage a specific borrower will choose at any point in time de- 
pends largely on the level and structure of  interest rates. With high interest 
rates generally or with lower rates but a steeply upward-sloping yield curve, 
borrowers will be more likely to choose ARMs. High interest rates force the 
borrower to the ARM (there is great utility to lowering the initial rate); rela- 
tively low short-term rates induce the borrower to the ARM. However, with 
lower rates and a flat term structure, borrowers will tend to select the FRM: no 
affordability problem “forces” the ARM and no relatively low short rates in- 
duce the ARM. 
Figure 4.2 illustrates both how the ARM share of conventional mortgages 
has varied over the 1984-89 period and the relationship between this variation 
and changes in the spread between the coupons on FRMs and ARMs. Large 
rate spreads (2.5 percentage points) in 1984-85  and mid-1987 to the end of 
1988 were associated with 40 to 60 percent ARM shares, while small spreads 
(1.5 points) in  1986 to mid-1987 and in late 1989 were associated with 20 to 
25 percent shares. 
Research by  Brueckner and Follain (1989) provides econometric evidence 
on ARM demand. Table 4.2 computes probabilities of the ARM being selected 
under different interest-rate assumptions, using  the Brueckner-Follain esti- 
mates. In the first computation, the FRM rate and the FRM-ARM rate spread 
are put at their mean values over the 1984-89  period (commitment rate data 
collected by Freddie Mac in its weekly survey of  125 major lenders), and all 
other variables in their equation are placed at their mean values over the esti- 
mation period. The computed ARM probability, 31 percent, is slightly less 
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Fig. 4.2  ARM  share and FRM  minus ARM  rate spread quarterly, 1984-89 
Source: Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation. 
Table 4.2  Probability of choosing an ARM in Different Interest-Rate 
Environments 
Experiment 
FRM-ARM  Probability of 
FRM Rate  Spread  Choosing ARM 
Mean values  11.23  2.15  .3 1 
15.00  2.15  .99 
11.23  2.15  .50 
Raising spread, high FRM rate  14.00  1.30  .82 
14.00  2.15  .95 
Changing FRM rate  10.00  2.15  .28 
Raising spread, low FRM rate  11.23  1.30  .12 
Source: Hendershott 1990, table 1 
mortgage originations during this period. The next two calculations show the 
sensitivity of the mortgage choice to the level of the FRM rate: an increase in 
the FRM rate to 15 percent would raise the ARM share from 3  1 to 99 percent 
(assuming an FRM-ARM initial coupon spread of  2.13, while a decrease to 
10 percent would only lower the share to 28 percent. The last four rows show 
the impact of variations in the FRM-ARM rate spread at two different levels 
of the FRM rate. Raising the spread from its historic low (1.3 percent) to its 73  Housing Finance in the United States 
high (2.75 percent) increases the ARM share by  13 (high FRM rate) to 38 (low 
FlIM rate) percentage points. 
4.2.4  A Closer Look at the Thrifts 
Figure 4.3 provides data on both  S&L behavior and the relative role of 
S&Ls as home mortgage investors over the past quarter century. The behavior 
of  S&Ls is reflected in the proportion of  S&L assets invested in home mort- 
gages either directly or indirectly through holdings of agency securities. The 
S&Ls’ presence in the home mortgage is measured as the ratio of  S&L total 
(direct and indirect) home mortgage holdings to total home mortgage debt out- 
standing. This presence is the product of the other two series in the figure, the 
fraction of S&L assets invested in home mortgages and the ratio of  S&L total 
assets to the book value of all outstanding home mortgages. 
The share of  S&L assets in home mortgages varied within a narrow 72 to 
74 percent range until  1981, before plummeting to 59 percent at the end of 
1984. The ratio slipped further to 57 percent at the end of  1987, but has since 
risen to 61 percent. The sharp decline in 1983 and 1984 reflected accelerated 
01 
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Fig. 4.3  Share of S&L total financial assets (TFA) in home mortgages, S&L 
share of total home mortgage market, and ratio of S&L TFA to total home 
mortgages outstanding 
Source: Flow of Funds Accounts. First three quarters of  1990 annualized. 74  Patric H. Hendershott 
growth in the S&L industry (18 percent annual growth rate), not an actual shift 
out of mortgages. 
Beginning in 1961 with 42 percent of the home mortgage market, the S&L 
presence rose gradually throughout most of the 1970s, reaching a peak of 51 
percent in 1977. Since then the S&L presence has been halved. The increase 
between 1969 and 1977 and subsequent decline through 1981 reflected swings 
in the size of the S&L industry relative to the size of the home mortgage mar- 
ket. The ratio of  the S&L total financial assets to total home mortgage debt 
outstanding rose from 0.56 in  1969 to 0.70 in 1977, before declining to 0.63 
in 1981. While S&L total financial assets grew between 1984 and 1988, they 
grew at a slower rate than the home mortgage market; with a constant S&L 
mortgage portfolio share, the S&L share of  the home mortgage market fell 
from 73 to 63 percent. 
The role of  MSBs is more straightforward. The MSB share of  the home 
mortgage market was roughly constant between 1961 and  1972, as was the 
ratio of MSB total financial assets to home mortgages outstanding. Since then, 
this ratio has declined almost monotonically, and the MSB share has dropped 
from 15 percent to 6 percent. To  a large extent, this decline is due to the shift 
of  the U.S. population from the Northeast, where MSBs are relatively im- 
portant, to the South and West, where MSBs are less important. 
Since early 1989, S&L assets have been shrinking rapidly; in just a year and 
a half, the ratio of  S&L total assets to home mortgage debt has fallen from 
0.36 to 0.25. In this year and a half, S&Ls have liquidated nearly $90 billion 
in  agency securities and over $50 billion in direct home mortgage holdings. 
The recent decline in S&L mortgage holdings follows directly from the in- 
creased capital requirements mandated by  the Financial Institutions Reform, 
Recovery, and Enforcement Act of  1989 (FIRREA).6 
The decline of the S&L industry stemmed directly from their asset-liability 
maturity  mismatch,  the  funding of  FRMs with  short-term  deposits (Kane 
1989). When interest rates surged to historic levels in the late 1970s and early 
1980s, capital in the S&L industry was wiped out and the incentive for risk 
taking took over. It is perhaps noteworthy that the vulnerability of  S&Ls to 
periods of sustained increases in interest rates continued to exist at least as late 
as 1989. S&Ls were still using roughly 40 percent of their short-term deposits 
to fund long-term FRM investments, and the $400 billion so funded slightly 
exceeded the volume so funded in 1978. Moreover, S&L ARMS  have rate caps 
that would bind in a period of sustained interest-rate increases. If interest rates 
6.  FIRREA strongly encourages relative home mortgage investment by S&Ls. S&Ls must now 
keep 70 percent of assets in qualified loans, versus 60 percent formerly, and fewer non-housing- 
related loans are now classified as qualified than was previously the case. In addition, restrictions 
on non-housing-related loans are substantially increased. While some of these restrictions are not 
yet fully in force, the decline in the home mortgage portfolio share of S&Ls has already been ar- 
rested. 75  Housing Finance in the United States 
Table 4.3  Correlation between Mortage Rates and  Capital Market Rates 







































Sources: Roth 1988, table 1, for 1972-87;  after 1987, my  computations. 
“Correlations  are between month-to-month changes in the Freddie Mac survey FRh4 rate and the 
ten-year Treasury rate. 
*Significantly  different from zero at a 5 percent confidence level. 
should repeat their 1977-86  pattern, taxpayers could well lose another $50 
billion or more in present-value dollars (Hendershott and Shilling 1992). 
4.3  The Impact of Securitization on FRM Coupon Rates 
Mortgage securitization should cause mortgage rates to be more closely 
connected to capital market rates. The impact of securitization on the general 
level of  mortgage rates is less clear. Empirical evidence relating to each of 
these impacts is discussed below.7 
4.3.1  Timing of Conventional FRM  Rate Adjustment to Capital 
Market Rates 
Roth (1988) analyzed the integration of  mortgage and capital markets by 
looking at trends in the month-to-month correlation of changes in coupon rates 
on  conventional mortgages and ten-year Treasuries annually from  1972 to 
1987. His results are reproduced and extended to include 1988-90 in table 4.3. 
Prior to 1982, the correlation of the changes ranged from -  .5 to +  .5 and was 
never statistically different from zero. After 1981, the correlation was never 
less than .58 and was always statistically positive. Moreover, after 1986, the 
correlation has been nearly .9. 
A potential problem with Roth’s analysis is that the mortgage rate incorpo- 
rates a call premium while the Treasury rate does not, and in some periods the 
value of the call premium may have changed markedly, possibly disguising a 
close relationship between the noncall components of  the mortgage coupon 
7. This section, too, draws heavily on Hendersbott (1991). 76  Patric H. Hendershott 
and the Treasury coupon.  Hendershott  and Van  Order (1989) attempted  to 
eliminate this problem by constructing a perfect mortgagelike capital market 
rate and estimating the adjustment of conventional mortgage rates to this per- 
fect rate (rather than to a Treasury rate). The analysis consisted of two parts. 
First, they estimated a price equation for government-insured mortgage pass- 
through. Second, they regressed conventional mortgage coupon rates on cur- 
rent and past values of the estimated perfect-market coupon rate taken from 
the Government National Mortgage Association (GNMA) equation. 
The price equation was estimated on weekly GNMA price and coupon data 
from the January  1981-July  1988 period. In this equation, the GNMA price 
was regressed on the coupon (adjusted to a bond-equivalent basis), the seven- 
year Treasury rate, and two determinants of the value of the borrower’s call 
option-the  term structure slope (seven-year rate less six-month rate) and an 
estimate of the volatility of  the seven-year rate. Various interactions of these 
variables were included to allow for nonlinear price responses. 
To  obtain the perfect-market rate, the estimated price equation was solved 
for the coupon rate after the mortgage price was set equal to one hundred less 
the actual points charged in the conventional market (less one point presumed 
to equal origination  costs). This coupon was then converted to a mortgage 
(rather than bond-equivalent) basis, and fifty basis points were added for ser- 
vicing and other costs. As the degree of integration increased, changes in the 
perfect-market  coupon rate should have been reflected more quickly in  the 
conventional rate (the data are again from Freddie Mac’s survey of  125 major 
lenders). 
Conventional rates were regressed on the current and lagged one-to-eight- 
week  values  of  the  perfect-market rates  for  various  parts  of  the  1971-88 
period. Table 4.4 reports the cumulative adjustment of  the conventional rate 
currently and over lags of  two, four, six, and eight weeks. The shift toward 
integrated markets is striking. The percentage of the change in the perfect- 
market rate that is reflected instantaneously in the conventional rate rose mono- 
tonically from effectively 0 in the 1970s to 8 in the 1980-82 period,  16 in the 
Table 4.4  Time Response of Conventional Rates to Fictional Perfect-Market 
Rates 
Adjustment to One-Point Rise in Perfect Rate 
Period  Current  3 Weeks  5 Weeks  7 Weeks  9 Weeks 
1986-88  0.59  0.95  0.96  0.87  0.84 
1983-85  0.16  0.55  0.68  0.83  0.88 
1980-82  0.08  0.45  0.75  0.93  1.05 
1976-79  0.01  0.36  0.62  0.66  0.86 
1971-75  0.06  0.17  0.37  0.56  0.74 
Source: Hendershott and Van Order 1989. table 5. 77  Housing Finance in the United States 
Table 4.5  Actual and Perfect-Market Effective Conventional FRM Rates (%) 
Perfect 
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Source: Hendershott and Van Order 1989, table 6 
1983-85  period, and 59 in the 1986-88  period. The fraction of the change in 
the perfect-market rate reflected in the conventional rate within two weeks rose 
monotonically from a sixth in the first half of the 1970s, to almost half in the 
early 1980s, to over half in the 1983-85  period, and to nearly one in recent 
years. 
4.3.2  Securitization and the Level of Mortgage Rates 
Table 4.5 lists annual values of  the actual conventional rate, the Hender- 
shott-Van  Order fictional perfect-market rate, and the difference between them 
for the 1971-88  period. The precise differences are, of course, subject to some 
error: the actual rate is a survey rate and the perfect rate is computed from an 
empirical equation estimated with error. Nonetheless, the overall pattern of the 
differences seems both systematic and plausible. The actual rate was three- 
quarters of a percentage point below the perfect-market rate in the 1971-75 
period; a third of a point below in the 1976-80 period; and roughly half a point 
above the perfect rate in the 1982-86  period. 
As explained earlier, the low mortgage rate in the 1970s can be attributed to 
tax  advantages for  thrift  mortgage  investments  and  portfolio  restrictions 
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relative shift of thrifts out of home mortgage investments owing to the reduced 
(non-) profitability of S&Ls and the expansion of S&L asset powers. The half- 
percentage-point premium in the early 1980s provided the incentive for the 
securitization of  conforming conventional FRMs. The premium covered the 
start-up cost of  the securitizers and the liquidity premium demanded by  in- 
vestors. 
Beginning in the middle of  1986, the actual rate is very close to the perfect- 
market rate, the conventional conforming mortgage market seemingly being 
fully integrated into capital markets. That is, as the volume of mortgage pools 
grew, bidask spreads were bid down (and thus the liquidity premium fell), and 
the per dollar costs of the securitizers declined. This suggests that the rates on 
conforming loans, which are eligible for purchase by the agencies, should have 
declined relative to rates on nonconforming or jumbo loans. 
Hendershott and Shilling (  1989) explained the relationship between rates 
on individual loans and a number of factors, using California data during the 
May-June  period of  1978 and 1986. The factors were loan-to-value ratio, loan 
size, precise month the loan was closed, dummy variables for geographic re- 
gions in the state, and whether the loan was on a new property, was under the 
conforming limit, or was just above the limit. The loan-to-value ratio had 
the expected positive impact; the loan size and the new  property dummies 
had the expected negative impacts; and the responses in the two years were 
remarkably similar. For those two years, however, the effects of the conforming 
limit differed markedly. In  1986, conforming loans had a rate thirty basis 
points lower than well-above-the-limit loans, and soon-to-be-conforming  loans 
had  a rate fifteen basis points lower (standard errors were only five  basis 
points). In 1978, however, the point estimate for the conforming loan coeffi- 
cient was only three basis points. 
It should be emphasized that the perfect-market rate listed in table 4.5 is 
computed from a GNMA price equation, not from an equation explaining 
prices on seven- or ten-year Treasury bonds. The working assumption of Hen- 
dershott and Van Order was that the GNMA market has been integrated with 
capital markets since 1981. This assumption seems plausible because GNMAs 
have full faith and credit guarantees and have traded like Treasuries, with com- 
parably low transactions costs and high volume, at least since 1981. 
4.4  Real House Prices and Home Ownership, 1960-89 
Systematic deviations of the conventional FRM  commitment rate from the 
perfect-market estimates-0.33  to 0.75 percentage points prior to 1981 and 
+0.5  point in the 1982-86  period-provided  a general stimulus for owner- 
occupied housing in the 1970s and a deterrent in the first half of the 1980s. 
This would translate into higher real house prices and home ownership rates 
in the 1970s and lower real prices and ownership in the first half of the 1980s. 
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rates, tax law, and so forth, can affect real prices and ownership (Hendershott 
1988). Thus, we certainly would not want to attribute all observed behavior to 
relative changes in  mortgage rates. Nonetheless, a look at changes in real 
prices and home ownership is interesting. 
4.4.1  Real House Prices 
Figure 4.4 contains two alternative measures of  U.S. real house prices, as 
well as a measure of real after-tax interest rates for the 1963-89  period: the 
residential investment deflator divided by the GNP deflator and the constant- 
quality new house price series computed by  the Bureau of  Census (old series 
through 1977, new one thereafter) divided by  the GNP deflator. The latter re- 
lates to single-family housing only and includes a land component. The two 
series tell basically the same story. Real house prices rose sharply between 
1965 and 1980 (by 21 to 26 percent) and fell in the first half of the 1980s by 
6 percent. 
The real after-tax interest rate in figure 4.4 equals an after-tax adjusted ten- 
year Treasury rate less the average appreciation rate in the residential invest- 
ment  deflator during the previous three years. The adjustment reflects the 
earlier evidence of  deviations between the actual and perfect-market home 
mortgage rates; the ten-year Treasury rate is lowered by  three-quarters of  a 
percentage point for the years before 1976 and by one-third point for the 1976- 
80 period, and is raised by one-half point for the years 1982-86. The tax rate 
is the average marginal tax rate on interest income and varies between 0.24 
and 0.3. 
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Hendershott (1991) relates the rate  of  change in  real  house  prices (the 
change in the logarithm) to both the level and change in the unadjusted real 
after-tax interest rate, as well as the rate of change in real GNP and a demo- 
graphic demand variable. Reestimation using the adjusted interest-rate variable 
(RAn yields 
dnp = z -  .00419 ARAT -  .00281 RAT  R2 = 0.58, DW = 2.00, 
(.00222)  (.00135) 
where z represents the contribution of the other variables and 1960-89  is the 
estimation period. Coefficients on both interest-rate variables are statistically 
negative at the 0.05 confidence level. 
I have used these coefficients to compute what real house price inflation 
would have been over the 1956-89 period if the real after-tax interest rate had 
stayed at its 0.24 percent average value over the entire period. The observed 
real residential investment deflator rose by 21 percent between 1965 and 1980 
and then fell by 6 percent between then and 1985. The recomputations say that 
two-thirds of the real increase is attributable to the low real after-tax rate during 
the 1966-79  period and that all of the real decrease is attributable to the high 
real after-tax rates in the first half of the 1980s. 
4.4.2  Home Ownership 
Home ownership varies enormously with age and household type. The aver- 
age ownership rate of  married couples age 35-44  years has exceeded that of 
couples under age 25 by  roughly 50 percentage points over the past quarter 
century. The rates for singles and other household heads increase similarly 
with age, but the rates are 20 to 40 percentage points lower for comparable- 
age singles than for marrieds. Rates for young other household heads are com- 
parable to those of  singles, but those of older other heads are closer to those of 
older married couples. 
Research on home ownership indicates a strong correlation with economic 
factors such as income (Haurin, Hendershott, and Ling 1988), wealth (Jones 
1989) and the relative costs of owning versus renting (Hendershott and Shilling 
1982; Rosen and Rosen 1980). These factors are correlated with age and fam- 
ily structure to varying degrees and thus explain at least part of  the overall 
correlation of ownership with age and family type. 
Table 4.6 shows a sharp increase in the ownership rate of  married couples 
between 1960 and 1980. For every age class, the increase is 11 to 14 percent- 
age points, with two-thirds of the increase coming in the 1970s. Table 4.7 con- 
tains data for married couples and single households for five age classes for 
three years: 1974, 1980, and 1987. These data indicate an even greater surge 
to ownership between  1974 and 1980 by  single households than by  married 
couples. For the four cohorts between ages 25 and 44, the increase was 7 to 11 
percentage points in these six years alone. 
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Table 4.6  Home Ownership Rates of Married Couples (%) 
Age of  Head  1960  1970  1980 
Under 25  23  26  37 
25-29  44  49  58 
30-34  62  66  75 
35-44  73  77  84 
45-64  75  81  88 
Over 64  78  79  84 
Source: Census of  Housing, 1960, 1970, 1980. 
Table 4.7  Home Ownership Rates by Household Types and Age of Head, 
Selected Years (%) 
Married Couples  Singles 
Age of Head  1974  1980  1987  1974  1980  1987 
Under 25  32.7  34.9  29.9  7.0  11.5  9.7 
25-29  54.2  58.2  52.5  13.0  20.2  19.4 
30-34  71.9  74.7  69.2  22.5  30.5  28.8 
35-39  78.1  82.2  78.0  26.2  37.1  35.7 
40-44  82.4  84.7  83.1  29.2  36.6  44.0 
45-49  85.1  86.2  86.0  35.3  35.5  44.0 
Over 49  83.7  87.1  88.9  54.4  57.4  59.5 
Sources: Annual Housing Survey and Housing Vacancy Survey. Data kindly supplied by  David 
Crowe of  the National Association of Home Builders. 
As figure 4.4 indicates, the 1970s were a period of negative and declining real 
after-tax rates. In contrast, these rates jumped sharply in the early 1980s, and 
the home mortgage rate rose especially, moving from a third of a point “below 
market” in 1980 to a half point above in 1982. Ownership by married couples 
under age 40 fell by roughly 5 percentage points. 
4.5  The Interest Sensitivity of Housing Production 
Increases in  market  interest rates have  traditionally been viewed as re- 
stricting housing demand through two channels. First, higher interest rates 
raise the ratio of mortgage payments to income. Because lenders set qualifica- 
tion standards in terms of this ratio, borrowers will be constrained to purchase 
smaller houses when interest rates rise, if  they are unable to provide a larger 
down payment. (Households will want to purchase smaller houses if the real 
after-tax interest rate has risen.) Second, with deposit rate ceilings in place, 
substantial increases in market interest rates cause deposit outflows and lead 
depository lenders to ration credit-to  require sufficiently larger down pay- 
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the absence of a ready supply of other credit, such as is supplied by a secondary 
mortgage market, the total volume of  credit is reduced. With both of  these 
channels operating, some households will  be  unable to  move  up  to larger 
houses, and some households will not be formed. Housing starts will drop, 
the average real value of starts will decline, and real house prices will soften. 
Arguably, the prominent changes in housing finance in the  1980s-the  re- 
moval of deposit rate ceilings, the widespread introduction of ARMS, and the 
securitization of conforming FRMs-should  have reduced the sensitivity of 
housing demand to increases in interest rates. 
4.5.1  Multiple Regression Analysis 
Three relatively recent studies have used multiple regression analysis to ex- 
amine possible changes in the sensitivity of  housing activity to increases in 
interest rates. Akhtar and Harris (1986-87)  and Throop (1986) both explain 
quarterly real residential investment over roughly the 1960-85  period. Ryding 
(1990) explains quarterly real  single-family residential investment over the 
1965-88  period. The models are similar in that real disposable income, real 
after-tax interest rates, and a variety of  disintermediation or credit-rationing 
dummy variables are the primary determinants of investment demand.* 
One advantage of  regression analysis is that it allows a direct test of  the 
impact of thrift deposit contraction in the early 1980s, the last period of con- 
traction prior to  1989-90.  If  the 1979-82  contraction did not lead to credit 
rationing, subsequent contractions are not likely to do so. The empirical results 
are mixed. Ryding estimates only one-third as large a response to his rationing 
proxy-the  spread between the three-month bill rate and the passbook savings 
rate-in  1979-82  as in the 1969-70 and 1973-75  periods. Akhtar and Harris 
estimate two-thirds as large a response in  1979-82  as in the earlier period, 
using zero-one dummies for periods of credit rationing. Finally, Throop finds 
no rationing in 1979-82. 
Figure 4.5 reproduces a simulation of Ryding’s model (the residential invest- 
ment equation plus some interest-rate relationships) for different regimes. A 
permanent one percentage point increase in the federal funds rate reduced in- 
vestment by about 15 percent between the late 1960s and middle 1970s, but 
by  only 7 percent in the early  1980s. Moreover, if  one assumes that credit 
rationing will no longer occur, the reduction is only 3 percent. That is, housing 
may only be a fifth as sensitive to interest rates now as it was in the 1970s. 
4.5.2  Vector Autoregressions 
An alternative to multiple regression analysis is estimation of  vector auto- 
regression models. Kahn (1989) and Pozdena (1990) both compare models 
8. The existence of credit rationing in some periods does not mean that the housing stock will 
be lower in the long run.  Increased production after the rationing may make up for reduced produc- 
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estimated over the 1983-89  period with models estimated in earlier periods 
(1956-79 for Kahn and 1960-82 for Pozdena). Pozdena explains total housing 
starts (monthly), and  Kahn  explains total real  fixed  residential investment 
(quarterly). Both relate the activity variable to its lagged values and lagged 
short-term interest rates (three-month bills and the federal funds rate, respec- 
tively) over the prior year.  Pozdena also includes lagged values of  the term 
structure slope (his bill rate less the AAA corporate bond rate) in his second 
model. 
Table 4.8 shows the percentage of variance in starts explained by Pozdena’s 
models that is accounted for by lagged starts, lagged bill rates, and the lagged 
term structure spread (in his second model). As can be seen, lagged bill rates 
account for only a third to a half as much of the explanation in the 1980s as in 
the earlier period. Pozdena also traces out the effect on housing starts of a one- 
standard-deviation increase in bill rates for both the pre-1983 and post-I982 
periods. For the pre-1983 period, the response peaks at a 60,000 decrease in 
starts over the fourth to sixth quarters. The post-1982 response is less stable, 
and the average decrease over these quarters is only about 20,000. 
Kahn does not report empirical estimates, but he does trace out his results 
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Table 4.8  Interest-Rate Variation and Housing-Starts  Variation (%) 
VAR  1  VAR  2 
Explanation  Pre-1983  Post-1982  Pre-1983  Post-1982 
starts  39.6  78.5  32.9  43.9 
T-bills  60.4  21.5  56.9  28.2 
Lagged term structure spread  -  -  10.2  27.8 
Source: Pozdena 1990, table  1. 
Note: Variance decomposition of starts, from twelth-lag vector autoregressions (VARs); in per- 
centage of variation explained, measured at twenty-four months. 
increase in the federal funds rate reduces real residential investment by about 
4 percent in the pre-1980 period versus  1.5  percent in the post-1982 period. 
The maximum decline is reached roughly seven quarters after the increase in 
rates. 
The Pozdena and Kahn results are remarkably similar (and are also consis- 
tent with Ryding’s results). Kahn has a slightly longer lag, but he is explaining 
expenditures,  which  slightly lag starts. Both  find the  1980s’ response to be 
only about a third of the earlier response. Not surprisingly, both authors con- 
clude that mortgage securitization and the introduction of ARMS  have signifi- 
cantly  reduce the volatility  of the  housing industry. Further,  greater contra- 
cyclical shifts in interest rates will be needed to obtain the same degree of 
monetary tightness and ease as was achieved with smaller movements in earlier 
decades. Finally, a less volatile housing industry could well lead to a more 
capital intensive and productive industry. 
4.6  Concluding Thoughts 
In the 1980s, the U.S. housing finance system was transformed from a one- 
instrument (FRM), deposit-based (and subsidized) system to a two-instrument 
(FRM and ARM), largely capital market system. In the 1960s and 1970s, mort- 
gage rates  were  “too low”  and real house  prices  and home  ownership rose 
rapidly, but bouts of credit rationing led to severe housing production cycles. 
In the 1980s, mortgage rates have been relatively higher but more closely tied 
to capital market rates, and an ARM was introduced for households to shift to 
when housing became less affordable-when  interest rates rose generally or 
when long rates rose relative to short rates. As a result, housing production is 
now less volative and (hopefully) will be more efficient. 
Two uncertainties seem to exist today regarding U.S. housing finance. The 
first relates to the collapsing thrift industry. While no large impact seems likely 
for conforming FRM rates owing to the securitization of that market, a decline 
in the correlation between mortgage and Treasury rates in 1990 has been ob- 
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FRM markets, with these rates getting out of  line relative to capital market 
rates just as conforming FRM rates did in the first half of the 1980s. (Unfortu- 
nately, we have no evidence on whether or not this is occurring.) This could 
lead to reduced housing demand, real prices, and home ownership. At some 
point, though, securitization of these markets should occur, by Fannie Mae and 
Freddie Mac below the conforming limit and by fully private sector entities in 
the jumbo market. 
The second uncertainty concerns the government-insured FHANA market. 
I have not discussed these FRMs because this market was effectively securi- 
tized prior to the 1980s and did not undergo major changes in the 1980s. How- 
ever, in response to a marked deterioration in the soundness of the basic single- 
family insurance fund, legislation was enacted in 1990 to substantially increase 
the cost of this insurance (Hendershott and Waddell 1990). Insurance premi- 
ums are rising by  45 to 85 percent (greater percentage increases for higher 
loan-to-value loans), and borrowers are being required to supply more money 
up front. FHA loans are used more heavily by  younger, less wealthy house- 
holds; survey data indicate that the FHANA share of the total home mortgage 
market during the 1984-89  period was twice as great for married couples un- 
der age 25 as for those above age 34 (Hendershott 1990, table 2). I conclude 
that the changes in the FHA program are likely to lead to further shrinkage in 
the FHA share of the FRM market and declines in home ownership rates of 
younger households. 
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